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Abstract  
In this paper, the impact of Chinese competition on Africa’s manufacturing value added is 
analyzed through a model of manufacturing. Using panel data on 44 African countries 
covering the period 2000 to 2013, and controlling for the usual determinants of 
industrialization – such as the size of the domestic market, the quality of infrastructure and 
governance – we find that exports of manufactured goods by China and other countries to 
African countries mainly exert a negative effect on African manufacturing, while a moderate 
real appreciation of African currencies vis-à-vis the renminbi positively influences 
manufacturing value added, probably due to the reduced cost of imported machine and 
transport equipment from China (which accounted for 36% of total African imports from 
China in 2013) and to the reduced price of imported consumption goods increasing the 
remuneration of poor workers and therefore improving their productivity. However, a strong 
real appreciation (of more than 33%) instead exerts a negative effect on African’s 
manufacturing, as traditional theory predicts. 
 
Key words: manufacturing, China, Africa, real exchange rates. 
 
JEL codes: E6, F6, O55, L6. 
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1. Introduction 
Industrialization has been the dream for developing countries in order to attain high 
incomes and to create employment. While many Asian countries have successfully realized 
this dream, this is far from the case for African countries. The share of the manufacturing 
value added of African countries1 in the world total increased modestly from 1.5% in 2000 to 
1.9% in 2013, while that of Asia increased from 30% to 46%. As Figure 1 shows, African real 
manufacturing value added (in 2005 US dollars) increased slowly over the period, while its 
share in real GDP decreased from 12% in 2000 to 10% in 2013. 
 
Figure 1. African real manufacturing added value (MAV) and its share in real GDP 
 
 Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and authors’ estimations.  
 
                                                          
1Only 44 African countries are retained in the calculation because of unavailable data for the rest (data 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and authors’ estimations; for a detailed 
explanation, see Section 3). 
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There is a sharp contrast between the low rate of growth of Africa’s manufacturing 
and the rapid growth of China’s exports of manufactured goods to Africa. While the 
manufacturing added value in real terms (in 2005 US dollars) of 44 African countries rose 
from $86 billion in 2000 to $133 billion in 2013 (i.e. an annual average growth rate of 3.5%), 
China’s exports of manufactured goods to Africa increased from $4.4 billion in 2000 to $86.7 
billion in 2013 (i.e. an average annual growth rate of 28%). Moreover, the average annual 
growth rate of China’s exports of manufactured goods to Africa was much higher than that of 
exports from the rest of the world to Africa (12.9%). China’s share in the global exports of 
manufactured goods to Africa thus increased from 5% in 2000 to 25% in 2013, with 
considerable variation across African countries (from a share of 2.7 % in Swaziland to 66% in 
Togo in 2013).  
Is China slowing down Africa’s industrialization through its huge exports of 
manufactured goods to the continent? This question is all the more relevant as African 
manufactured goods are principally sold on domestic markets. The share of goods 
manufactured in Africa that are exported is low on average; in 2010 it ranged from 0.3% in 
Burundi to 28.7% in Mauritius.2 Therefore, it is likely that competition from foreign suppliers 
exerts its effects on African manufacturing mostly on domestic markets, rather than on 
foreign markets.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the different factors that determine the 
competitiveness of African manufacturing enterprises and to analyze the special role of China. 
We assume that competition from foreign enterprises exerts pressure on African enterprises 
through the volume and the diversity of foreign exports as well as their relative prices. The 
                                                          
2 Output and exports of manufactured goods originate from INDSTAT2 UNIDO and UNCTAC 
STAT, respectively. 
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rest of the paper presents the model to be estimated, the econometric estimation and finally 
the results. 
 
2. The model to be estimated 
Three types of factors are considered to affect manufacturing in Africa.  
1) Structural factors that influence transaction costs. These essentially comprise the level of 
infrastructure, landlocked status, the quality of institutions and the size of the domestic 
market, all of which are essential for explaining the development of the manufacturing 
sector in Africa (Carey et al., 2007). Their expected effects are positive, except in the 
case of being landlocked. Special Economic Zones created in African countries by the 
Chinese government to develop manufacturing activities are also expected to have a 
positive impact. 
2) Foreign competitors. These include (i) competitors in domestic markets, whose extent 
can be measured by the volume of manufactured goods imported by African countries 
from China and from the rest of the world; and (ii) competitors in foreign markets, 
whose extent can be measured by the volume of exports of manufacturing goods by 
China and the rest of the world to the world market. Their expected effects are 
negative. The greater in volume and the more diversified the manufactured goods 
exported by foreigners to domestic African and foreign markets, the more significant 
the negative effects on the manufacturing of African countries are likely to be.  
3) The relative price of manufactured goods, which can be expressed using real exchange 
rates with different trade weights according to the competitors and markets 
considered. Exonerations of customs duties must also be taken into account, as some 
African countries belong to customs unions and have signed agreements with the 
United States (i.e. the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA) or with the 
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European Union (i.e. the “Everything but Arms” initiative, or EBA) allowing quota- 
and tariff-free access to their markets (de Melo, and Portugal-Perez, 2012). The 
suppression of customs duties by developed countries (in order to make African 
exports easier) and African customs unions are expected to have positive impacts on 
manufacturing. However, the impact of real exchange rates is ambiguous. 
The traditional view is that a depreciation of the real exchange rate has a positive 
impact on manufacturing as it improves the competitiveness of local enterprises vis-à-vis their 
foreign competitors on domestic and foreign markets and may therefore reduce the volume of 
foreign exports (discussed above). This assumption has been put forward in particular by 
Rodrick (2008), who advises the governments of low-income countries to systematically 
undervalue their exchange rates in order to compensate for the handicaps they face due to 
market failures. 
             However, some arguments play in the other direction (Guillaumont Jeanneney and 
Hua, 2011). The first is that the intensification of foreign competition due to a real 
appreciation of the currency is favorable to the productivity of manufactured firms, as some of 
these firms are obliged to close their worst-performing factories or even disappear. This is a 
kind of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” benefiting the best-performing enterprises and 
seems to be the case, for example, for the Ethiopian shoe industry (Gebre-Egziabher, 2009; 
Redi, 2009; Sonobe et al., 2009). The second is that a real appreciation not only implies a rise 
in domestic prices relative to foreign prices, but also a change in the internal structure of 
prices or a rise in the price of non-tradable goods vis-à-vis the price of tradable goods. As 
non-qualified work is a typical non-tradable good, an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
increases the real remuneration for unskilled workers expressed in tradable goods. One may 
suppose that this increase would induce an improvement in the efficiency of workers in 
countries where the wages of unskilled workers are still very low (Guillaumont and 
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Guillaumont Jeanneney, 1991). As early as 1957, Leibenstein stressed that in developing 
countries, labor remuneration that is too low might negatively impact workers' health and 
their working capacity, and he showed that the motivation of workers acts on efficiency – 
what he referred to as “X-efficiency” (Leibenstein, 1957, 1966). This hypothesis appears 
relevant to the context of Africa, where workers’ wages are particularly low. The third 
argument is that a real appreciation reduces the relative cost of imported capital goods and 
increases wages relative to the cost of capital. This induces more capitalistic production, 
encourages technological innovations and thus increases labor productivity and manufacturing 
competiveness. It is certainly possible, therefore, that imports of certain types of 
manufactured goods – such as machines and transport equipment – are favorable to the 
manufacturing competiveness of African countries, in contrast to imports of consumption 
goods. In 2013, the share of Africa’s imports of machines and transport equipment coming 
from China was 36%.        
The real exchange rate issue is all the more important as several African countries 
have experienced a strong appreciation of their real exchange rates (see Figure 3). The 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rates of African countries relative to the currencies 
of their main manufacturing trade partners3 was 21% from 2000 to 2013 (Figure 2). This is 
higher than their appreciation relative to the renminbi (19%), which is due in turn to the recent 
appreciation of the renminbi relative to the US dollar since 2011. When considering just the 
                                                          
3The real effective exchange rate of African countries is calculated as a geometric average of the real 
effective exchange rates of African countries weighted by the trade share of each African country in 
the total trade of considered African countries. The real effective exchange rate of an individual 
African country is measured as the geometric average of the real bilateral exchange rates of this 
African country relative to its main trade partners weighted by the trade share of each partner in the 
total of all considered trade partners of the country. 
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period from 2000 to 2010, the real appreciation of African countries’ currencies vis-à-vis the 
renminbi was particularly high at 52%, compared with the appreciation of 25% relative to the 
continent’s main trade partners. Indeed, the evolution of the Chinese real effective exchange 
rate relative to the currencies of African countries has been markedly different from that of its 
exchange rate relative to the currencies of China’s main trade partners. From 2000 to 2013, 
the renminbi depreciated by 19% in real terms relative to African trade partners, while it 
appreciated by 25% relative to China’s own main trade partners (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. China’s real effective exchange rate relative to its main trade partners and the real 
exchange rates of African countries relative to their main trade partners and to China  
 
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics and CERDI calculations.  
Note: A rise in the curve means a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate of China relative to 
its trade partners, an appreciation of the real effective exchange rates of African countries relative to 
their trade partners or an appreciation of real exchange rates of African countries relative to China.  
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The changes in the real exchange rates of individual African countries relative to 
China exhibit great diversity, as do their exchange rates relative to their other trading partners. 
Over the period from 2000 to 2013, the currencies of 29 African countries appreciated relative 
to the renminbi in real terms while those of the rest depreciated, with the two most extreme 
cases being the real appreciation of the Eritrean nakfa by 8.4% and the real depreciation of the 
Congolese franc (the currency of the Democratic Republic of Congo) by 7.3% (Figure 3). 
This diversity allows an econometric estimation of the controversial impact of real exchange 
rates on African countries’ manufacturing. 
 
Fig. 3. Annual average change of African bilateral real exchange rates relative to the 
renminbi, 2000-2013 (%) 
 
Note: A positive value means a real appreciation of African currencies relative to the renminbi. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
 
In a first equation, we focus on competition from China on African domestic markets, 
since most manufactured goods produced by African countries are destined for the domestic 
market. The first equation to be estimated is the following: 
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Equation (1) 
itfitcitijtititititit ERMaXFaXCaZaIaGaPCaInfaaMAV lnlnlnlnlnln 876543210 ++++++++=
 
where MAV represents the added value of manufacturing, Inf captures the level of 
infrastructure, PC represents private consumption or the size of the domestic market, G 
represents the quality of institutions or governance, I is a dummy variable for landlocked 
status, Z is a dummy variable representing Chinese Special Economic Zones created in 
African countries, XC is China’s exports of manufactured goods to an African country and  
XF the exports of manufactured goods from the rest of the world (excluding China) to an 
African country, and ERM represents the real effective exchange rates of the African 
countries relative to their main import partners weighted by the geographical origins of 
imports of manufactured goods. In order to better capture the special role of China, for each 
African country ERM is divided into a real bilateral exchange rate relative to China and a real 
effective exchange rate relative to the country’s other import partners. The indices i, c, f and t 
represent, respectively, African countries, China, the rest of the word and the years. 
In a second equation, the factors of Africa’s export competitiveness are added to the 
above equation. The resulting second equation is the following:   
Equation (2) 
itfitcitijtititititit ERaXFaXCaZaIaGaPCaInfaaMAV lnlnlnlnlnln 876543210 ++++++++=
iitititfwtcwt CUaEBAaAGOAaXFWaXCWa 131211109 lnln +++++  
where XCW and XFW are, respectively, the exports of manufactured goods by China and 
other countries to the world market, AGOA and EBA are dummy variables with value equal to 
1 when African countries participate in customs agreements with the United States or with 
Europe and 0 otherwise, CU is a dummy variable equal to 1 if African countries belong to a 
customs union, and ER represents the real effective exchange rates relative to trade partners 
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now weighted by the destination of exports of manufactured goods as well as the geographical 
origins of imports. As before, ER is divided into the real exchange rate of African countries 
relative to their trade partners (excluding China) and the real bilateral exchange rate relative 
to China. 
Three disturbance terms (unobserved individual effects fixed over time, temporal 
effects and error terms) are added into equations (1) and (2) to be estimated empirically. 
Recall that the expected signs of all the variables are positive except for exports of China and 
other countries to Africa or to the rest of the world, and inland that are negative. However, the 
signs of the real exchange rates are uncertain.  
 
3. Econometric estimation 
The econometric analysis of manufacturing added value is applied to the panel data for 
44 African countries over the period 2000 to 2013. The beginning year corresponds to the first 
China/Africa Cooperation Forum, and the choice of the African countries depends on data 
availability. Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Sao Tome & Principe, Somalia and Zimbabwe are 
excluded because of unavailable data on manufacturing added value. Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland are excluded because of unavailable data on exports of manufactured 
goods in the CEPII BACI database, which are used to calculate the trade weights in the real 
effective exchange rates.  
The manufacturing added value is the net output of industries belonging to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) divisions 15-37 after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. The data are in real terms (2005 US dollars) and 
originate from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. For Algeria, Chad, D.R. 
Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya and Madagascar, the World Development Indicators give the 
growth rate of the real manufacturing added value in 2005 dollars, which are converted into 
Etudes et Documents n° 21, CERDI, 2015
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 volume by using nominal manufacturing value added in 2005. We note that the data on 
manufacturing output published by UNIDO are available only for a few countries and for a 
few years. In any case, manufacturing added value is a better indicator than output because it 
is net of intermediate inputs. 
The level of infrastructure is based on the African infrastructure development index 
calculated by the African Development Bank (2013), which includes transport, electricity, 
ICT, water and sanitation. The data end in 2010, and we have assumed that infrastructure 
levels are the same for 2011, 2012 and 2013. Private consumption is real household 
expenditure in 2005 US dollars, taken from the United Nations Statistical Division. The 
quality of institutions is represented by a measure of political stability and the absence of 
violence/terrorism, one of the six measures of the quality of governance proposed by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) and calculated each year by the World Bank.4 The measure has 
estimated values from -2.5 to 2.5, with a higher value indicating better governance outcomes. 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) did not report on quality of governance for 2001, which is calculated 
as the average of the quality of governance between 2000 and 2002. Inland is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for landlocked African countries and 0 otherwise. China’s Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa, which are aimed at developing manufacturing activities in 
African countries, are represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 for the African countries 
and the years in which an SEZ was created, and 0 for the remaining countries and years. Data 
on this are drawn from Bräutigam and Tang (2011). 
                                                          
4 Kaufmann et al. (2010) propose six measures of governance quality: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, and control of corruption (for detailed data, see 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls). The results of the estimations are 
similar for the six measures.  
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Data on the exports of manufactured goods from China and the rest of the world to 
Africa and to the world market are obtained from UNCTAD statistics. The various real 
exchange rates come from CERDI and are calculated using the nominal exchange rates and 
consumer prices issued by the IMF in its International Financial Statistics. These are 
weighted by the geographical origin of imports of manufactured goods for the estimation of 
the first equation, and also by the destination of exports for the second equation, both coming 
from CEPII’s BACI database (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).    
AGOA is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years in which those sub-Saharan 
African countries that have received AGOA beneficiary status from the United States and 0 
for the rest. In 2000, the United States adopted the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA)5 to facilitate the exports of sub-Saharan African countries to the American market by 
exonerating customs tariffs under some conditions. Approximately 30 countries are AGOA 
beneficiaries, and the list is revised each year by the United States. Several countries are 
added and several are excluded each year. EBA is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 34 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 6 and 0 for the rest. The Everything but Arms (EBA) 
initiative, adopted by the European Union on 5 March 2001, has resulted in all imports to the 
European Union  (EU) from the LDCs (as defined by the United Nations) being duty-free and 
quota-free, with the exception of weapons. We choose to introduce as customs unions the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)7 and the Central African Economic 
                                                          
5 See www.agoa.info for details. 
6 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape-Verde, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Dem Rep, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.  
7 WAEMU: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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 and Monetary Community (CAEMC),8 as they are the most complete and efficient customs 
unions in Africa, and moreover feature a common currency (Carrère, 2004, 2006). 
The means and standard deviations of the variables are provided in Table 1 and the 
definitions and sources of all the variables are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Two econometric methods of panel data analysis are applied to control for 
unobservable individual heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002; Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). The 
fixed effects model uses a within estimator and deals with individual specific effects across 
African countries by including a dummy variable for each country, but has the weakness that 
the time-invariant independent variables (such as inland, WAEMU, CAEMC and EBA) are 
lost from the estimation, and this method retains a risk of endogeneity. Hausman and Taylor’s 
(1981) estimator overcomes these drawbacks by instrumenting the endogenous variables in a 
random effects model. In the present estimations, several variables are considered to be 
endogenous – private consumption of African countries, exports of manufactured goods from 
China and the rest of the world to Africa and to the world, real exchange rates and China’s 
Special Economic Zones – but not infrastructure, governance of African countries, WAEMU, 
CAEMC, AGOA, EBA or inland. 
Before performing the econometric regressions in the equations, we need to know if 
the variables are stationary at an absolute level to avoid fallacious results. Panel data unit root 
tests (Levin et al., 2002 and Im et al., 2003) are thus applied in which time trend and panel-
specific means (fixed effects) options are used; the variables are lagged by one period. The 
mean of the series across panels is subtracted from the series to mitigate the impact of cross-
sectional dependence (Levin et al., 2002). The results reported in Table A2 of the Appendix 
allow us to reject the null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root, so we can accept 
                                                          
8 CAEMC: Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.  
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 the alternative hypothesis that the variables are stationary at an absolute level. Therefore, the 
estimations of the equations are not spurious. 
The econometric results of the two methods are presented in Table 2 for equation (1) 
and in Table 3 for equation (2). The results of the two econometric methods are very similar. 
The comments here are focused on the results of the Hausman-Taylor model with time-fixed 
and country-fixed effects. 
The dominant factor of manufacturing added value is the size of the domestic market: 
a rise of 1% in household consumption increases manufacturing added value by 0.57% 
(column 6 of Table 2). This result was expected, in particular as production for the local 
market generally acts as a learning process before exporting. Good infrastructure and good 
institutions exert significant positive effects on manufacturing. The effects of being 
landlocked and of China’s Special Economic Zones are not statistically significant, probably 
due to the facts that the local products are mainly sold in domestic markets and the SEZs are 
either in their first period of operation or are still under construction (Bräutigam and Tang, 
2011).  
It seems that exports of manufactured goods from China and the rest of the world to 
Africa are detrimental to African industrialization, mainly through the competition they create 
with African manufactured products on the continent’s domestic markets. Their estimated 
coefficients are -0.04 and -0.06, respectively (column 6, Table 2). The coefficient of China’s 
exports is lower than that of the rest of the world, probably due to the high share of machine 
and transport equipment in China’s exports to Africa. However, as the growth of exports of 
manufactured goods from China to African countries (28%) was more than double the growth 
of exports from the rest of the world (12.9%) during the period from 2000 to 2013, China’s 
negative impact on African manufacturing (an annual average rate of decrease of 
manufacturing added value of -1.12% (-0.04*28%) in African countries) was in fact higher 
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 than that of the rest of the world (0.90% (-0.06*12.9%)). In total, foreigners contributed an 
annual average rate of decrease of -1.92% in African countries, which is somewhat more than 
half the annual average growth rate of African manufacturing added value during the same 
period (3.5%). On the other hand, exports from China and the rest of the world to the world 
market have had no impact on African manufacturing added value, probably due to the weak 
share of exported goods in manufacturing added value (column 14, Table 3).  
In contrast to the traditional view, the appreciation of the real exchange rates of 
African countries is favorable to manufacturing. This effect seems principally to be due to the 
appreciation relative to the renminbi (columns 3 to 8, Table 2), which likely reduces the price 
of current consumption goods more than the appreciation relative to the other foreign 
currencies. It could also be due to the reduced cost of capital through the imports of machines 
and transport equipment from China (which made up 36% of total imports from China in 
2013). We can imagine that this positive impact of the real exchange rate is decreasing. 
Indeed, this appears to be the case when the real exchange rate and its square are 
simultaneously introduced into the regression (see columns 5 and 6 of Table 2). The turning 
point of the real exchange rate is 133, suggesting that a high appreciation of African 
currencies (by more than 33% relative to 2005) exerts a negative effect on manufacturing, 
while a weaker appreciation of the currencies has a positive effect. Moreover, the positive 
impact of a real appreciation remains even if the exports of manufactured goods from China 
and the rest of the world to an African country are removed (columns 7 and 8 in Table 2), 
although a real appreciation of African currencies stimulates African imports from outside 
and in this way may be detrimental to manufacturing (Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua, 
2015).  Finally, among the measures of customs tariff exoneration, only AGOA exerts a 
positive effect on manufacturing production in Africa. 
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 4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we focus on the impacts of Chinese competition on Africa’s 
manufacturing added value. To this end, we use a panel data of 44 African countries over the 
period from 2000 to 2013 to estimate a model of manufacturing. We control for the usual 
determinants of industrialization – such as the size of the domestic market, and the quality of 
infrastructure and governance – and we confirm that improvements in domestic infrastructure 
and institutions and the size of the domestic market are very important for African 
industrialization. 
 We find that the exports of manufactured goods to Africa by both China and other 
countries exert a negative effect on African industrialization, while a moderate real 
appreciation of African currencies vis-à-vis the renminbi influences manufacturing value 
added positively. We explain the latter effect by the reduced cost of imported machine and 
transport equipment from China (which accounted for 36% of African total imports from 
China in 2013) and by the reduced price of imported consumption goods, which raises the 
remuneration of poor workers and therefore improves their productivity. However, a strong 
real appreciation that pushes the real exchange rate index beyond 133 (the mean is 97) exerts 
a negative effect on African’s manufacturing, as predicted by the traditional theory.  
African industrialization is still in its first phase in which locally produced 
manufactured goods are limited and are mainly intended for domestic markets; the continent 
suffers greatly from import competition coming from China and other foreign countries. Some 
trade protectionism could therefore be justified. However, a systematic real depreciation of 
African exchange rates would probably not be appropriate, as it would have a negative impact 
on the productivity of local firms. On the other hand, and in accordance with the traditional 
theory, in a second phase of industrialization a real depreciation could be favorable to the 
exports of manufactured goods by African countries. From this standpoint, the recent 
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 stabilization (since 2010) and then depreciation of the real exchange rates of African 
countries, particularly in relation to the renminbi, is good news.  
In any case, improvements to infrastructure and governance, in which African 
governments should play a leading role, seem essential for the development of manufacturing 
of African countries.      
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 Table 1: Summary of variables  
Variables Obs Units Means Std. 
Dev. 
min Max 
Index of infrastructure 616  18.36 16.86 0.37 84.41 
Private consumption 616 billion $ 16.4 35.4 0.2 226 
Governance 616  -0.61 0.51 -1.56 0.86 
China’s exports of manufactured 
goods to Africa (without China) 
616 million $ 776 1730 0.1 16300 
Foreign exports of manufactured 
goods to Africa (without China) 
616 million $ 4010 7790 33.7 56600 
China’s exports of manufactured 
goods to the world 
616 billion $ 919 508 223 1740 
Foreign exports of manufactured 
goods to the world  
616 billion $ 6720 1440 4420 8350 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis import 
partners 
613 2005=100 104.1 21.2 57.9 345.9 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis import 
partners except China 
613 2005=100 107.4 22.3 61.0 360.8 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis trade 
partners 
613 2005=100 104.3 21.2 58.6 359.0 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis trade 
partners except China 
613 2005=100 106.0 22.0 59.3 366.6 
REER of Africa relative to China 613 2005=100 94.7 18.4 49.6 272.3 
AGOA 616  0.70 0.45 0 1 
EBA 616  0.5 0.5 0 1 
WAEMU 616  0.18 0.39 0 1 
CEMAC 616  0.11 0.15 0 1 
Inland 616  0.25 0.43 0 1 
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Table 2:  The determinants of real manufacturing added value of African countries (2005 US dollars), 2000-2013 (equation 1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Fixed 
effects 
Hausman
–Taylor 
Fixed 
effects 
Hausman
–Taylor 
Fixed 
effects 
Hausman
–Taylor 
Fixed 
effects 
Hausman–
Taylor 
ln(infrastructure) 0.17*** 
(2.81) 
0.18*** 
(3.03) 
0.20*** 
(3.15) 
0.16** 
(2.37) 
0.20*** 
(3.20) 
0.21*** 
(3.41) 
0.21*** 
(3.31) 
 
0.21*** 
(3.55) 
Ln(private consumption) 0.56*** 
(8.87) 
0.59*** 
(9.67) 
0.56*** 
(8.73) 
0.61*** 
(9.08) 
0.54*** 
(8.55) 
0.57*** 
(9.26) 
0.49*** 
(8.13) 
0.53*** 
(8.95) 
Governance 0.28*** 
(6.78) 
0.27*** 
(6.67) 
0.30*** 
(7.01) 
0.31*** 
(6.40) 
0.28*** 
(6.74) 
0.27*** 
(6.64) 
0.25*** 
(6.17) 
0.25*** 
(6.08) 
Inland  -0.47 
(-1.18) 
 -0.62 
(-1.35) 
 -0.47 
(-1.15) 
 -0.35 
(-0.93) 
China’s Special Economic 
Zones 
-0.02 
(-0.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
-0.04 
(-0.67) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.04 
(-0.68) 
-0.03 
(-0.99) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
Ln(China’s exports of 
manufactured goods to Africa) 
-0.04** 
(-2.33) 
-0.04** 
(-2.37) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.04** 
(-2.30) 
-0.04** 
(-2.33) 
-0.04** 
(-2.37) 
  
Ln(foreign exports of 
manufactured goods to Africa) 
-0.07** 
(-2.19) 
-0.06** 
(-2.00) 
-0.07** 
(-2.19) 
-0.07** 
(-2.16) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.29) 
-0.06** 
(-2.12) 
  
Ln(REER of Africa relative to  
import partners) 
0.19*** 
(3.67) 
0.17*** 
(3.66) 
      
Ln(REER of Africa relative to  
its import partners except 
China) 
  -0.05 
(-0.42) 
0.35 
(0.73) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.41) 
0.04 
(0.36) 
Ln(REER of Africa relative to 
China) 
  0.29** 
(2.46) 
0.26** 
(1.97) 
2.70** 
(2.33) 
2.64** 
(2.29) 
3.00** 
(2.58) 
2.93** 
(2.53) 
(Ln(REER of Africa relative to 
China))²  
    -0.27** 
(-2.15) 
-0.27** 
(-2.10) 
-0.31** 
(-2.42) 
-0.30** 
(-3.37) 
R² 0.51  0.54  0.53  0.53  
Number of observation 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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 Table 3: The determinants of real manufacturing added value of African countries (2005 US dollars), 2000-2013, in an augmented model with 
competitors on foreign markets (equation 2) 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 Fixed 
effects 
Hausman–
Taylor 
Fixed 
effects 
Hausman–
Taylor 
Fixed 
effects 
Hausman–
Taylor 
Fixed 
effects 
Hausman–
Taylor 
ln(infrastructure) 0.17** 
(2.35) 
0.15** 
(2.18) 
0.19** 
(2.60) 
0.18** 
(2.51) 
0.19*** 
(2.64) 
0.17** 
(2.51) 
0.22*** 
(3.45) 
0.22*** 
(3.64) 
Ln(private consumption) 0.50*** 
(6.63) 
0.62*** 
(8.71) 
0.49*** 
(6.33) 
0.59*** 
(8.51) 
0.48*** 
(6.33) 
0.57*** 
(8.05) 
0.47*** 
(7.42) 
0.51*** 
(8.32) 
Governance 0.32*** 
(6.41) 
0.29*** 
(6.06) 
0.33*** 
(6.46) 
0.31*** 
(6.17) 
0.31*** 
(6.39) 
0.29*** 
(6.07) 
0.26*** 
(6.10) 
0.25*** 
(5.98) 
Ln(China’s exports of 
manufactured goods to Africa) 
-0.04** 
(-2.17) 
-0.04** 
(-2.26) 
-0.05** 
(-2.31) 
-0.05** 
(-2.39) 
-0.04** 
(-2.23) 
-0.04** 
(-2.27) 
  
Ln(foreign exports of manufactured 
goods to Africa) 
-0.09** 
(-2.59) 
-0.07** 
(-2.03) 
-0.10*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.08** 
(-2.28) 
-0.10** 
(-2.74) 
-0.08** 
(-2.22) 
  
Ln(China’s exports of 
manufactured goods to the world) 
0.18 
(0.36) 
0.20 
(0.41) 
0.25 
(0.50) 
0.27 
(0.55) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.19 
(0.41) 
  
Ln(foreign exports of manufactured 
goods to the world) 
-0.09 
(-0.63) 
-0.09 
(-0.62) 
-0.12 
(-0.77) 
-0.12 
(-0.78) 
-0.09 
(-0.61) 
-0.09 
(-0.60) 
  
 Ln(real effective exchange rates of 
Africa vis-à-vis trade partners) 
0.20*** 
(3.44) 
0.20*** 
(3.48) 
      
 Ln(REER of Africa vis-à-vis trade 
partners except for China) 
  -0.004 
(-0.04) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
0.04 
(0.35) 
0.05 
(0.45) 
0.04 
(0.40) 
Ln(real exchange rate of Africa 
relative to China) 
  0.26** 
(1.92) 
0.25* 
(1.88) 
2.66** 
(2.07) 
2.65** 
(2.07) 
2.81** 
(2.37) 
2.76** 
(2.33) 
(Ln(real exchange rate of Africa 
relative to China))² 
    -0.27** 
(-1.88) 
-0.27* 
(-1.89) 
-0.29** 
(-2.21) 
-0.28** 
(-2.17) 
AGOA 0.07* 
(1.89) 
0.05* 
(1.69) 
0.08** 
(2.09) 
0.06* 
(1.72) 
0.07* 
(1.95) 
0.05* 
(1.76) 
0.03 
(.97) 
0.02 
(0.80) 
EBA  -0.02 
(-0.09) 
 -0.03 
(-0.08) 
 -0.22 
(-0.32) 
 0.04 
(0.70) 
WAEMU  0.04 
(0.08) 
 0.07 
(0.13) 
 -0.59 
(-1.15) 
 -0.10 
(-0.23) 
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 CEMAC  -0.49 
(-0.78) 
 -0.17 
(-0.24) 
 0.03 
(0.06) 
 -0.59 
(-1.10) 
Inland  -0.58 
(-1.16) 
 -0.69 
(-1.35) 
 -0.53 
(-0.83) 
 -0.34 
(-0.89) 
R² 0.51  0.52  0.52  0.53  
Number of observation 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
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 Appendix Table A1: Definitions and sources of variables 
Name of variables Calculation methods  Sources 
Real manufacturing added value  Real manufacturing value added of African countries (2005 US$) World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
Infrastructure  A composite indicator of transport, roads and telecommunication in 
Africa 
African Development Bank 
Private consumption Household consumption expenditure in 2005 $ United Nation Statistics Division 
Governance  Political stability in African countries calculated by Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
World Bank 
Landlocked countries Dummy variable equal to 1 for landlocked African countries Authors’ identification 
China’s bilateral exports of manufactured 
goods to African countries 
China’s exports of manufactured goods to African countries divided 
by the import unit values of the last ones (2005=100) 
UN Comtrade 
UN UNCTAD stat 
Foreign real exports of manufactured 
goods to African countries 
Exports of manufactured goods of the world (except China) to African 
countries  divided by import unit values of the last ones (2005=100) 
UN Comtrade 
UN UNCTAD stat 
China’s exports of manufactured goods to 
the world 
China’s exports of manufactured goods to the world except the 
considered African country divided by its export unit values 
(2005=100) 
UN Comtrade 
UN UNCTAD stat 
Foreign exports of manufactured goods to 
the world 
Foreign exports of manufactured goods (except China) to the world 
except the considered African country divided by world export unit 
values (2005=100) 
UN Comtrade 
UN UNCTAD stat 
Real effective exchange rates of Africa 
relative to import partners 
Real effective exchange rates of African countries relative to import 
partners 
Calculated by CERDI using data 
from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
Real effective exchange rates of Africa 
relative to import partners except China 
Real effective exchange rates of African countries relative to import 
partners except China 
Calculated by CERDI using data 
from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
Real effective exchange rates of Africa 
relative to trade partners 
Real effective exchange rates of African countries relative to their 
trade partners 
Calculated by CERDI using the 
data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
Real effective exchange rates of Africa 
relative to trade partners except China 
Real effective exchange rates of African countries relative to trade 
partners except China 
Calculated by CERDI using data 
from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
Real bilateral exchange rates of African Nominal bilateral exchange rate of African countries versus China IMF’s International Financial 
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 countries versus China deflated by relative consumer prices between African countries and 
China 
Statistics 
AGOA Dummy variable equal to 1 for African countries benefiting customs 
exonerations to the American market  
Agoa.info 
EBA Dummy variable equal to 1 for 30 African countries having the status 
of Least Developed Countries 
 
China’s Special Economic Zones in 
African countries   
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a Chinese SEZ exists in African 
countries (Mauritius, Niger and Zambia since 2006, Algeria, 
Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria since 2007) and 0 otherwise 
Bräutigam and Tang (2011) 
WAEMU Dummy variable equal to 1 for Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
 
CAEMC Dummy variable equal to 1 for Cameroon, Chad, the Central African 
Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo 
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Appendix 2. Results of panel data unit root tests 
Variables Levin-Lin-Chu unit root 
test* 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root 
test* 
African manufacturing value added 0.0000 0.0000 
Infrastructure 0.0000 0.1645 
private consumption 0.0000 0.0000 
Governance 0.0000 0.0000 
China’s exports of manufactured goods to Africa 0.0000 0.0000 
Foreign exports of manufactured goods to Africa 0.0010 0.0000 
China’s exports of manufactured goods to the world 0.0004 0.0158 
Foreign exports of manufactured goods to the world 0.0000 0.0048 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis import partners 0.0027 0.0092 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis import partners except China 0.0065 0.0073 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis trade partners 0.0080 0.0149 
REER of Africa vis-à-vis trade partners except China 0.0031 0.0132 
REER of Africa relative to China 0.0021 0.0088 
Note. *P-value. The panel data unit root tests are applied with time trend and panel (fixed effects) means. 
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